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PETITION FOR REHEARING OF RESPONDENTS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOF.TATION AND 
DAVIS AND WEBER COUNTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, the Respondents Utah Department of Transportation, Davis 
and Weber Counties respectfully petitions for rehearing of the 
opinion of this Court filed November 9, 1989 which reversed the 
decision of the Trial Court. Counsel certifies this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
It is always disconcerting to litigants when a decision 
by a Trial Court which was rendered fairly is reversed by the 
Court of Appeals and its decision is, from all appearances a 
result oriented and went far beyond that which the parties ever 
requested or what was argued in their briefs. 
POINT I 
IT APPEARS THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A 
DECISION TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT AND 
QUIET TITLE IN THE APPELLANTS AND THEN 
PROCEEDED TO IGNORE WHATEVER FACTS IN 
THE RECORD THAT WERE TO THE CONTRARY. 
The Respondent on page two of its brief indicated in 
the last paragraph that "... The Lower Court bifurcated the trial 
of the issues in this case. It was determined to first try the 
issue of whether the property was located in Weber County. If 
the Appellants lost on this issue, which they did, there was no 
reason to then try the issue of whether the Respondent Davis 
County conducted the tax sale property." A reading of the 
Appellants' brief does not indicate any objection with this 
statement. This Court sua sponte in its footnote 2 on page 4 
found because this Court could not find a ruling on the bifurca-
tion issue in any order which it could find, ruled an abandonment 
of this defense on the part of the Respondent UDOT. (A copy of 
page 4 is attached as Exhibit "A") 
The Appellate Court referred on many occasions in its 
decision to the trial of the earlier case of Toone v. LeGrande 
Johnson Construction Co., Civil No. 20915 (Davis District Court). 
The Toone and Baxter cases involved the exact same issues, but 
only between different parties. The Plaintiff-Appellants (R. 
124-130) specifically referred to the trial of the Toone case and 
indicate the issues were bifurated and attached a copy of the 
pretrial Order. From the foregoing it was always assumed by the 
parties that the present action would also be bifurated. It 
would be a total exercise in futility to try the issue of whether 
the tax sale was conducted properly by the Respondent Davis 
County, if the subject property was found to not be located in 
Davis County. Finally, on page 16 of the proceedings before 
Judge Roth on August 4, 1986, the attorney for Respondent Utah 
Department of Transportation makes specific reference to the 
bifurcation of the issues in this case by talking about what 
issues are to be tried in the first trial. (Copy attached as 
Exhibit "B") 
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Finally, the Plaintiff-Appellant never disputed the 
statement contained in the Defendant-Respondent Utah Department 
of Transportation's brief that in fact the issues in this case 
have been bifurcated. It can only constitute a sheer abuse of 
discretion and a definite prejudice against the Defendants-
Respondents for the Appellate Court to conclude that the 
Defendant-Respondent Utah Department of Transportation abandoned 
its defense of whether the tax sale by the Respondent Davis 
County was conducted properly. 
The Respondents cite the case of UDOT v. Glen E. 
Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (1979). In this case the Defendant who was 
acting pro se attempted to introduce evidence before the Supireme 
Court which had not been argued in the Lower Court. The Supreme 
Court would not allow the Defendants to argue for the first time 
evidence which was being heard for the first time on the appeal. 
By this reasoning it would be totally improper for the Appellate 
Court to now consider and rule on evidence which was not raised 
or controverted by the Plaintiff Respondents. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLATE COURT WRONGLY CONCLUDED THAT 
A QUIET TITLE ACTION IN 1946 FOUND THE SIX 
ACRES IN QUESTION TO BELONG IN DAVIS COUNTY 
It appears that whenever an Appellate Court becomes so 
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result oriented, it proceeds to bootstrap its decision with 
erroneous and wrong conclusions that are not supported by the 
record. 
On page 2 of the Appellate Court's decision it reads as 
follows: 
In March, 1946, title to the 18 acres 
tract near the border separating Davis 
and Weber Counties was quieted in Tasma 
Dansie in a decree that contained a 
legal description of the tract and 
characterized it as lying in Davis 
County. 
The Defendant-Appellants prepared an Exhibit "C" which 
is located between pages 432 and 433 of the record which depicts 
and shows the 1946 quiet title action. The decree described the 
property which it found to be Weber County. This property is 
identified in yellow. The decree also described certain property 
as being located in Davis County. This property was identified 
in red on the Exhibit. The subject 6 acres is depicted in blue. 
The 1946 decree shows the subject six acres as being located in 
both counties and the Plaintiff-Appellants never questioned the 
foregoing in their brief. (Copy attached marked Exhibit "C") 
For the Court of Appeals to conclude facts to the contrary 
constitutes a clear usurpation and abuse of its descretion. 
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POINT III 
THE APPELLATE COURT IN ITS RESULT ORIENTED 
DECISION, FOUND IT NECESSARY TO GO OUTSIDE 
THE RECORD TO BOOTSTRAP ITSELF IN FINDING A 
BASIS TO REVERSE THE LOWER COURT. 
The Court of Appeals on page 7 of its decision relied 
on some laws and ordinances of the State of Deseret 1850-51 which 
it had found on file at the L.D.S. Church Historian office. A 
clear reading of the record and transcripts on file in this case 
indicate that none of the foregoing was presented by either party 
in the trial below. Clearly the foregoing deprives the parties 
from having a fair trial on the issues in the case. If indeed 
some additional information was found, in the historical office 
of the L.D.S. Church, the case should be remanded to the trial 
court for furth€*r consideration. 
The reasoning of the Appellate Court is clearly 
erroneous and prejudicial to conclude that a clear definite 
channel of the Weber River existed in any of the years 1850, 
1855, 1866, or 1886. The boundary between the two counties was 
the Weber River, but where was the river located. It is 
impossible from the record for either the Appellate Court or the 
Trial Court to come up with a metes and bounds legal description 
of where the Weber River was in the location of the subject 
property in the years referred to above. 
The survey notes shown in Defendants Exhibits 14, 15 
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and 16 were only surveyed along the section lines. There is 
absolutely no legal metes and bounds description of the Weber 
River outside of the section lines. 
This Court, though it was not present to hear the 
evidence and see the demeanor of the witnesses, concluded the 
trial court was wrong when it ruled that a controversy did not 
exist at all times prior to 1893 as to the location of the Weber 
River so as to allow Davis and Weber Counties to invoke the 
provisions of the 1888 compiled Laws of Utah § 86 which reads as 
follows: 
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty 
shall arise as to any county boundary, the 
same may be determined by the county surveyors 
of the counties interested, and in case they 
fail to agree, or otherwise fail to establish 
the boundary, the county courts of either or 
both counties interested, may engage the 
service of the aforesaid Territorial Commis-
sioner, who, with the said county surveyors, 
or either of them, if but one appear for that 
purpose, shall proceed forthwith to permanently 
determine such boundary line at the expense 
of the counties interested by making the 
necessary surveys and erecting suitable monu-
ments to designate said boundaries, which shall 
be deemed permanent until superseded by legis-
lative enactment. Nothing in this act shall be 
construed to give the surveyors, mentioned here-
in, any further authority than to erect suitable 
monuments to designate said boundaries as they 
are now established by law. 
Clearly the record and transcripts in this case reveal 
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this case was to be decisive of the boundary between Davis and 
Weber Counties (page 16 of the transcript of the hearing on 
August 4, 1986 before Judge Roth). 
Exhibits "C", "H" and "E" attached to the Defendant-
Respondents' brief clearly show that a dispute existed between 
Davis and Weber Counties as to the location of the Weber River in 
the years prior to 1893. Weber and Davis Counties were not 
trying to establish a boundary other than the location of the 
Weber River, but where was the Weber River located. 
CONCLUSION 
The Reversal by the Court of Appeals is totally 
contrary to the evidence presented. It can only be assumed that 
something was presented to the Court of Appeals that created some 
kind of bias or prejudice against the Respondents in this case. 
The foregoing manifested itself in the result oriented decision 
rendered in this case. There is absolutely nothing in the record 
in this case for the Court of Appeals to conclude that a metes 
and bounds description existed of the location of the Weber River 
prior to 1894. That a controversy existed as to the location of 
the Weber River in 1893 so to cause the two Respondent Counties 
to have concern where the boundary between their two counties was 
located. 
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The foregoing further manifests itself in the refusal 
of the Court of Appeals to allow the Respondent Utah Department 
of Transportation to litigate the issue of whether the tax sale 
was conducted properly by Davis County. 
It is abundantly clear the Court of Appeals exceeded 
its discretion and went outside the issues raised on appeal and 
the arguments and evidence presented in order to arrive at its 
decision of reversal and refusal to allow the Respondent Utah 
Department of Transportation to try the issues raised in its 
answer. 
The Court of Appeals was very shortsighted because by 
this ruling it does total violence to the location of the current 
boundary between Weber and Davis Counties. Instead of helping to 
permanently locate the boundary between Weber and Davis Counties, 
this decision will create utter chaos. 
The decision of the Appellate Court to reverse the 
decision of the Trial Court will not put this case to rest, but 
only serve to increase future litigation and appeals and create 
confusion as to where the boundary is between Davis and Weber 
Counties. 
DATED this / day of December, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN C' WARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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EXHIBITS 
to acquire title when taxes were unpaid, or to convey title 
through a tax deed.2 UDOT also pleaded collateral estoppel 
based on a 1978 judgment dismissing a damage action by Ronald 
Baxter*s former cotenant, Toone, against the contractor UDOT 
permitted to remove gravel from the property adjoining the 
Baxters'. 
In February 1983, the trial court granted UDOT summary 
judgment on the collateral estoppel defense. Because Toone was 
determined not to be the owner of the adjacent property in the 
1978 judgment—based on a jury's determination that it lies 
2. As an alternative defense# UDOT also pleaded that the 1969 
tax deed from Davis County was invalid because statutory tax sale 
procedures were not followed. In its brief, UDOT 
mentioned—without citing us to the record—that trial of its two 
defenses was "bifurcated" by the trial court# with the separate 
trial on the alleged tax sale invalidity to be heard only if UDOT 
failed to establish the tax deed invalidity at the first trial by 
proving its allegation that the six acres lie within the 
boundaries of Weber County. Our independent scrutiny of the 
record before us in this ten-year-old action has unearthed no 
oral or written motion for such a bifurcation, see Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(b)(1), a request presumably governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 
42(b), and no order of the court granting such a request. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2). The issue of the validity of the tax 
sale proceedings that led to the 1969 tax deed was not raised by 
anyone at the pretrial hearing or explicitly preserved in a 
pretrial order in this case for later resolution. Indeed, there 
is no mention of this defense in the record before this court 
other than in UDOT's pleading. In light of these circumstances, 
UDOT must be deemed to have abandoned this alternative defense, 
and it is not entitled to another trial on this alternate theory 
if the judgment appealed from here, which is based on the 
purported location of the subject six acres within Weber County, 
cannot withstand appellate review. 
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1
 THE COURT: Is it going to be confusing to the jurors 
2 to hear that they are parties to the action even though they 
3 are not going to make any determination thatfs going to affect 
4 either county, they wouldn't be asked to answer any questions? 
5 I MR. WARD: I wouldn't think so, not in the first portion 
of the trial thatfs going to take place, because we are talking 
? about whether--! think it would be more confusing to the Jury 
8 J if Weber and Davis Counties were not in and they would speculate 
why aren't they in, because presumably it is going to be determ-
10 inative of where the boundary is between the two counties 
H MR. FULLER: I think it would be preiudicial to have 
12 the counties in because I think Mr. Ward's attempt is to try to 
13 show that both counties support his position. And I think to 
14 I make it a fair trial, the counties shouldn't be involved in the 
^ 1 litigation there 
16 MR. WARD: Well, they were involved in the first one. 
17 
9 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
They were part—Davis County was a party to the first one. 
^Well,^your Honor, if the Court is inclined to jo that, we 
will withdraw our^tj-pulati^n wj^t^ Mr^. Hess . IJ^that^s. going 
to ^  keep ^them J.n_the
 m law sui t. 
MR. HESS: For crying out loud. 
MR. WARD: We think thev should be in the law suit, 
your Honor. 
24
 MR. HESS: If that!s the c a s e — 
2
^ I THE COURT: Wait a minute, just sit down. The whole 
f- . l # o ' J 1 6 
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